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The Brazilian economy has undergone profound changes since
the early 1970s. During this time, the external and internal
economic conditions significantly altered. The two oil shocks,
changes of the interest rates on the international capital mar-
kets, the following debt crisis, terms of trade deterioration,
soaring inflation rate, high external and public deficits are the
uppermost phenomena which characterised the Brazilian economy.
From the point of view of economic policy, it is very important
that the stabilisation programs should be accompanied by a suc-
cessful structural adjustment process. New investments financed
from domestic and/or foreign sources have definite significance
in the realisation of such goals. Under these prevailing condi-
tions the clear-cut answer to, and the knowledge of the main de-
terminants of the social and private cost of capital are necessa-
ry and sine qua non to a more efficient utilisation of this pro-
duction factor.
* I am grateful to PD Dr Friedrich L. Sell (University of Gieflen,
until February 1989 Institute of World Economics, Kiel) for his
valuable advice and comments during the research work and to
Matthias Liicke (Institute of World Economics, Kiel) for his
help and comments. I extend special thanks to Dr. Ulrich Hie-
menz (Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel) who carefully helped
to revxse the final version of this paper. The vxews expressed
are those of mine only and do not necessarily reflect their
views. I thank for the help of Mrs. Angela Husfeld who contri-
buted to the statistical calculations and Mrs. Christiane
Schroder who carefully typed the text.In this paper the main determinants of cost of capital
in the Brazilian manufacturing industries are analysed. From them
six sectors are chosen to be samples, which are the following:
steel and iron, machinery, electric machinery, automobile, tex-
tile, footwear industries. Two of them (steel and iron, machine-
ry) are capital intensive sectors. The following two (electric
machinery, automobile) are rather technology intensive sectors.
The last two (textile, footwear) are labour intensive sectors.
The central objectives of this paper are the description and
analysis of (a) the distribution of capital, (b) the sources of
the capital, and (c) the cost of the capital. This is done by
focusing on the investment records, on the system of financial
intermediation, and on the factors directly determining the cost
of capital. The cost of capital at the sector level is calculated
in two different ways. The estimates are based on empirical data
provided by companies, stock exchanges, and national statistics.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises and
briefly analyses the theoretical concepts on cost of capital and
clarifies the concepts to be used in this paper. Section 3 ana-
lyses capital flows from the point of view of financial inter-
mediation as well as distribution among manufacturing sectors.
The market and non-market type allocation mechanisms are demon-
strated. In Section 4, some macroeconomic factors are presented
which directly or indirectly influence the cost of capital. These
concern savings, indebtedness, and monetary policy. Then, Section
5 assesses the availability of credit, subsidised and marketrates of interests and the effects of inflation and taxation.
Section 6 provides two different estimates of the cost of capi-
tal: (a) the Rate of Return on Equity and (b) the Weighted Aver-
age Cost of Capital. The final Section provides a summary of the
main findings.2. Cost of Capital Concepts
2.1. Definitions
Corporate profitability calculations are generally made on
the basis of the principle of rate of return and/or cost of
capital . The rate of return is the yield investors can earn
on their capital assets (the aggregate portfolio of equity and
debt). In the literature the generally used definition of cost
of capital is the rate of return that a business could have if
it chose another investment with equivalent risk - in other
words the opportunity cost of the funds employed as the result
of an investment decision. As an alternative definition, the
1) In the investment theories the rate of return - which can
interpreted as a company-based measure - and the cost of
capital have been for almost two decades dominated by two
theories of investment. The neoclassical theory originated by
Jorgenson and the "q" theory developed by Tobin.
The neoclassical theory starts from the firm's optimisation
behaviour that is maximising the rate of return or discounted
net cash flow or it uses an alternative measure: the user cost
of capital (cost of using one more unit of capital in
production). To derive the user cost of capital, besides the
interest rate, which is the basic determining measure other
important factors (depreciation, taxes, inflation, credit
subsidies) have to be taken into account, as well. Other
methods were developed, too. Some of them are based on the
discounted cash flow principle, e.g. the adjusted present valuo
approaches, which are known in corporate finance or on the
factor price relations (e.g. Cobb-Douglas production function
calculating the capital stock on the basis of the rental cost
of capital and the level of output in the present and in the
future).
As an alternative to the above, the Tobin's "q" theory says
that the investment is a function of q, the ratio of the market
value of new investment (debt and equity) to the current value
of corporate assets or the replacement cost.
It has been shown (Hayashi, 1982, p. 213) that the modified
neoclassical theory and the "q" theory are in long-run actually
equivalent.cost of capital is calculated using weighted average of costs
of debt and equity.
In practice the various rate of return concepts differ in
several points: (1) whose concern is taken into account (compa-
ny or investor), (2) the ways of valuation of assets (book
value or market valuation), (3) the used broader or narrower
definition of return and capital employed (e.g. tax, interest,
current value, etc.). Among the most important measures for the
rate of return there are the company-based rate of return and
capital market-based rate of return (Holland 1984).
The company-based rate of return measures have basically
two different calculations and each has before and after tax
versions. In the first group, the rates of return on business
assets are calculated by relating operation incomes either to
(1) inventories plus plant and equipment or to (2) inventories
plus plant and equipment plus net monetary assets or to (3)
total assets employed in business operations or to (4) total
fixed assets employed in business operations. In the second
group, the rates of return on equity or net worth or own
capital mean the ratio of inflation adjusted profit to the same
denominators mentioned in the first group, minus the market
1) There are calculations which are partly modified versions
of the second group (e.g. the inflation adjusted profit in the
numeraire is corrected with the market value of debt multiplied
by change in consumer price index or in addition to it the
numeraire is corrected with the change in the value of monetary
assets).10
value of debt. A partly modified version of this latter ratio
will be applied in our analysis of Brazil.
The market-based rate of return measures are even more
manifold: (1) the net and real return to investors ; (2) valu-
2) ation ratios ; (3) cost of capital developed from Tobin's "q"
3) theory , which is a measure linking the company based and
capital market-based rates of return; or (4) methods applied in
corporate finance like among the adjusted discount rate ap-
proaches the most well known the MM's formula (Miller-Modig-
liani 1967, p. 169) and the weighted average cost models.
According to the practice one of the most reliable and widely
used weighted average cost models is Gordon's dividend-growth
model (Gordon 1962). This latter model will be applied in our
analysis as an alternative calculation of cost of capital in
the Brazilian manufacturing industries.
The company-based and market-based conception groups of cost of
capital measurements are seemingly different but analyses have
shown (Holland 1984, p. 29 or p. 43) that in long run the two
1) Calculated from the dividends received by stockholders plus
net interest received by lenders, plus change in market value
of stock, plus ratio of change in market value of debt to
market value of stock plus, market value of debt at the
beginning.
2) Market value of firm's security to the market value of
assets are defined in four different ways.
3) Operating income after tax related to corporate's market
value.11
rates are to be the same although, in short run they can dif-
fer.
In this paper, two cost of capital calculation methods
will be applied. First, calculations of rate of return on equi-
ty (A) . They can demonstrate the opportunity costs of capital
at sector levels, and allow inter-sectoral comparisons. Second,
the weighted average cost of capital method (B). At the firm
level this method means that this value is calculated as a
weighted average of the costs of capital of various sources.
Among the sources the principal division lies between the
shareholder's equity and debt (long and short term).
(A) The first calculation to be applied in this paper is
based on the opportunity cost concept. Data on corporate net
profits (after monetary correction and before income tax) and
net equity (realised social capital plus reserves plus accumu-
lated profit minus accumulated losses) have been used. The rate
of return of sector i (r.) is given by:
i i \ „. net profit
v _L / r. — — — ———— — — — — —
1 net equity
The data will be calculated as arithmetic average of rates of
return of sample companies in each manufacturing sector.12
(B) The second calculation, the weighted average cost
model relies on the market capitalisation rate which is one of
the basic principles of corporate finance.
The first important element of this model is the cost of
equity (k ):
d
(2) ke = -2 + g
o
where d /P is the current dividend yield and g is the growth
rate of dividend per share. The cost of equity is defined as
the rate at which the future dividends must be discounted in
order to arrive at the value of the initial time, equal to the
market value of the firm's stock. Under high inflationary con-
ditions the variables must be adjusted (Modigliani-Cohn 1979,
p. 24) unless they were originally indexed.
The second important part of the model is the real cost of
borrowing and the calculation of effective cost of debt (k, ):
(3) kfc = (1-T)(IE/B)
where T is the effective tax rate, IE the interest payment, and
B the average debt outstanding in a given year.
In this approach the cost of capital is a weighted average
of the costs of different sources of capital available to theBibliofhek
des fnstituts fur Weitwirtschaf}
13
firm. The weights used in the calculation are set according to
the proportions of each source in total capital, i.e.
(4) k = w k + w, k,
av e e b b
where e and b represent equity and borrowing (debt), and the
weights satisfy the
(5) w + w, = 1
e b
condition.
2.2. Conceptual and Methodological Problems
The application of the methods used in this paper raise
some conceptional and practical questions. Even such simple
calculation as the rate of return encounter certain conceptual
problems. Among them the most important is that the rates of
return based on accounting data can never be free of ambigui-
ties of definition and errors of estimation. Such distortions
can be caused either by the imperfect competition on the capi-
tal market or by various externalities e.g. government credit
policy decisions, fiscal, tax and budgetary policies, oligopo-
listic conditions, etc. In the conditions of underdeveloped
capital and stock markets the social and private rates of re-
turn may significantly differ.14
Although, many private rates of return are known, correct
calculation of sector rates of return is not always feasible
because the availability of data on private rates of return is
limited. The published company data (Visao, Conjuntura Econo-
mical usually contain information regarding the largest 500-
6000 enterprises. Sectors dominated by small and medium size
enterprises get underweighted representation, and sector aver-
ages are determined by the results of the bigger listed com-
panies. Therefore, the calculated values can be considered only
as proxy of sectoral rates of return.
There are some general problems to the practical use of
the chosen weighted average cost model, too. First of all, the
equity market should be broad enough, i.e. the number of listed
companies and the trade in shares have to be large enough. Only
under such conditions a reliable assessment of the market value
of meaningful segments of companies can be made. In underdevel-
oped equity markets, equity is often substituted by a signifi-
cant amount of debt. Information on interests paid is, however,
scarce. Thus an adequate market valuation of debt and the total
cost of capital becomes even more difficult.
It is a more general methodological problem that the
weighted average cost of capital calculations are usually made
for two purposes. First, it is generally used by firms, in
taking decisions on investment projects. Second, it is used at
the macro-economic level to inform the governments on the aver-
age cost of capital in the whole economy which can be then
influenced by means of incentives and taxation policies. At the15
sectoral level the average cost of capital can give useful
information on certain determinants (profitability, credit
subsidy, etc.) of structural changes. However, the calculations
of these estimates suffer from a lack of sufficient aggregated
data at the sectoral level and involve some rigorous assump-
tions.
Besides the general methodological problems there are some
special conditions prevailing in Brazil such as the 'savings
gap' existing in most developing countries, the adverse impacts
of domestic public debt (crowding out effect), and servicing
the enormous foreign debt (deteriorating creditworthiness and
outflow of capital) on the domestic capital market. The highly
regulated Brazilian financial intermediation and banking acti-
vities, huge inflation rates, the relatively narrow equity
market, and credit subsidisation distort the functioning of
domestic capital market and influence interest rates. The
distortion of cost of capital leads to a misallocation of capi-
tal.
2.3. Investment, Saving, Interest Rate
The public sector has a strong impact on savings and in-
vestment decisions taken by the private sector. This impact is
made both directly through the choice of public investment
projects, and indirectly through the impact of government's
taxation, spending and domestic credit policies.16
Government policies usually aim at stimulating the private
sector output and expanding the productive capacity of the
public sector. The main economic means to achieve them are
basically a supply-side policy on the one hand and public in-
vestment projects on the other. It is very important, that the
policy means used to increase the public sector's productive
capacity do not contradict the incentives favouring private
savings relative to consumption, and attractiveness of private
capital formation (Khan and Knight, 1982).
The general effects of government policies on private
sector saving and investment are illustrated on Figure 1. The
horizontal axis of the figure measures real private saving and
investment. The vertical axis measures the real return on sav-
ing and the real cost of fixed capital investment. As the fig-
ure shows the volume of investment is negatively related to the
cost of capital. The total supply of funds available to domes-
tic investment (S) consists of domestic savings (S ) and for-
eign savings. This latter has the forms of net capital inflows
(S_) and net capital outflows (-S,,). They influence the total
c t
savings and the interest rates in opposite ways.
Under the conditions of financial repression, ceilings and
other restrictions are imposed on the nominal interest rates
offered for savings deposits. If, in addition, inflation occurs
these interest rate ceilings may imply very low real rates of
return on financial savings. As inflation accelerates the real
rates frequently become negative.17
Figure 1 Effects of Various Policies on Private Sector
Saving and Investment
s-s^sr






Source: Khan and Knight (1982) and own modification
The impact of financial repression is illustrated in Fi-
gure l(a). As a result of a combination of domestic inflation
and interest rate ceilings, the real return on savings is ini-
tially equal to r . At this interest rate, the supply of avail-
able total savings is equal to OD, the savings demanded by
private sector investors is equal to OC. The amount of private
fixed capital formation is constrained by the supply of sav-
ings. The interest rate ceilings imply that the economy remains18
at point A, where the actual level of fixed capital formation
is equal to the amount of savings available at that interest
rate. Meanwhile, the domestic savings are equal to OF, the
foreign savings, that is the private sector's balance of pay-
ments deficit, are equal to FD. The continuous excess demand
for investment funds is DC.
If interest rate ceilings were eliminated, the equilibrium
in the domestic market for savings would be at E, to the extent
that the supply of either domestic or foreign savings is inter-
est rate elastic. The equilibrium interest rate r will be
e
above r . As compared with the repressed situation, the private
sector's current account deficit would rise from FD to GH. It
is brought about by an increased domestic investment financed
by foreign capital inflow rather than a low rate of savings.
There can be doubt, however, about the extent to which the flow
of foreign savings reacts to changes of real interest rates.
Another important issue is the direct effect of government
taxation and spending policies on interest rate and their indi-
rect effect on private sector saving and investment. The Figure
l(b) illustrates that a shift of either curve to the left can
decrease the real volume of private capital formation. The tax
on interest earnings lowers the after-tax return on savings to
r , raises the cost of investment to r_ and reduces the equi-
librium volume of private sector investment from I to L.19
The policies that shift either curve to the right have the
opposite effect. This shift means a reduction in the tax on
interest income which increases the rate of private savings and
investment. The total savings is supposed to have a positive
real interest rate elasticity.
The overall deficit of the public sector on the private
sector investment has the same impact as a change in the tax on
saving because it tends to "crowd out" interest sensitive pri-
vate spending. This is illustrated in Figure Kb). At the ini-
tial balanced public sector budget, the public sector saving
and investment are I with an interest rate of r . In the case
o o
of public sector deficit, which is measured as equal to KN and
financed out of private savings, the interest rate and private
savings should rise to r and to S.. respectively. Meanwhile,
private investment must fall to I- because the difference is
increasingly absorbed by the public sector. This effect is
mitigated to the extent that a rise in interest rate induces
an inflow of foreign savings.20
3. Allocation of Capital and Credit in the Brazilian Manufac-
turing Industries
3.1. Investment
After an impressive growth rate in the 1960s and early 1970s
the Brazilian economy was slowed down after the oil price
shocks. The economic performance was further deteriorated by
the debt crisis and increasing inflation. During this time the
major contributor to the country's economic growth was always
industry. The economic policy, especially in the 1970s aimed
at, first of all, diversification of the industrial base. This
process was led by government owned enterprises (Carneiro,
1987, p. 6). The principal objectives of the massive investment
program were (a) import substitution of basic industrial in-
puts, e.g. steel and other metals, (b) development of the eco-
nomic infrastructure.
In the 1970s the share of total investment in the GDP was
always above 20%. It reached especially high levels in mid of
the decade (Table 1). Since the early 1980s, the situation
changed and the rate of investment has fallen gradually below
the average level of the previous decade.
The more than 10 percentage point decrease in the rate of
investment between 1975 and 1983 was basically the consequence
of two factors. First, the mounting external debt brought about
a significant cut-off of access to international capital
markets. The external financial sources, which had previously21






































































































































































































































































































11) = !2!tl6) + correcting items.
b
I7i 3S part of total ill gross capital formation.
Note: Total gross capital formation.figures are made UP mainly by private and public sectors' fixed capital formation pius changes in
stocks.
Sources: Anuario Estatistico do Brazil 198b, P. 451-453. L.A. Corre3 do Lago et ai.. P.80 and own calculations22
provided the necessary funds to many investment projects sub-
stantially dried up. Second, the public sector's deficit played
an important role.
The increasing budget deficit, the need to finance it and
high inflation rate compelled the authorities to cut the public
sector investment significantly. It was reduced by more than
half from mid 1970 onwards. The reduction was carried out un-
evenly among the three government levels (Table 1). In the
1970s, the federal and the state governments reduced their
investment expenditures as percentage of GDP by more than 50%.
The investments by municipal governments dropped by 25-30%. As
a result, the respective shares of investment in GDP became
very similar in size.
During the 1970s, the federal enterprises could only in-
crease significantly their investments. It grew not only in
value but in share of GDP as well. The federal enterprises'
fixed capital formation made up almost 55% of the total gross
capital formation of Brazil in 1979, whereas, this share was
not higher than 15% in 1970. Over this time period, this could
happen only at the expense of the enterprises' increasing in-
debtedness at home and abroad. Their investment dynamism was
slowed down after the second oil price shock from 1980 onwards.
Over the 1970s, the ratio of public sector investments to
private sector investments never exceeded the 20-25%. In the23
mid 1970s, the decrease of this ratio to around 12-13% was
brought about by the significant reduction of public sector
investment.
A closer look at the fixed capital formation data of total
and selected manufacturing industries between 1970 and 1985
reveals various trends (Table 2). The explanation of these
changes and diversity lies in sectoral development policies, in
the Brazilian government's economic policy, and in the appli-
cation of various market and non-market determined interest
rates. The analyses of most of these reasons go beyond the
scope of this paper. Studies on the manufacturing industries
give profound analyses and explanation to the various invest-
ment records. Below, the most important trends in investments
of manufacturing industries are only listed:
(1) Over the 1970s the share of total manufacturing industry
in the total gross fixed capital formation of Brazil was fluc-
tuating and it ended up with a continuous decline from 1976 on-
wards (Table 2).
(2) The ratios of various manufacturing sectors in the gross
fixed capital formation of total manufacturing industry dif-
fered. Among the six surveyed manufacturing sectors it was the
transport industry that experienced the most significant de-
cline in its share. A similar trend can be seen in the case of
the textile industry, meanwhile a relative success was achieved
1) See the sector studies on the Brazilian manufacturing
industries published in the Kiel Working Papers Serie of the
Institute of World Economics.Table 2 - Gross Fixed Capital Formation in the Brazilian Manufacturing Industries in Current Billions of Cruzeiros































































































































































































































































































Sources: Anuario Estatistico, Rio de Janeiro, 1986, p.
calculations.
453 and UN Industrial Statistics Yearbook, various issues; own25
by the wearing apparel industry. The iron and steel industry,
which is to a great extent state owned or controlled could in-
crease its share. This industry has benefited mainly from pub-
lic loans provided at a reduced rate of interest. The shares of
machinery and electrical industries increased as well (Table
2) .
(3) Different trends can be seen, too, in the changes of the
ratio of gross fixed capital formation to value added at
sector levels (Table 3). Between 1972 and 1980, the whole
manufacturing sector is characterised by a drop of almost 90 %
in the share of investment to value added.
(4) The falling trend in the ratio of gross fixed capital
formation to value added is fairly general over the sectors
surveyed. This share dropped most drastically in the case of
transport machinery. In size of decrease it was followed by the
textile sector. The electrical machinery and machinery sectors
could increase or maintain their shares before a sudden and
significant drop in 1979 and 1980 respectively. It was only the
iron and steel sectors which could significantly increase and
maintain their shares.. Over the 1970s, these shares generally
exceeded by 2 to 3 times the average level of the manufacturing
industries.
3.2. Financial Intermediation in Brazil
The financial system of Brazil does not fit either in the
pattern of industrialised countries nor in the repressed capi-
tal market model. Financial intermediation and financial dee-
pening in Brazil has, for the last 3 decades, developed in a26
Table 3 - Gross Fixed Capital Foriation in the Brazilian Manufacturing Industries in Current Billions of Cruzeiros and






















































































































































































































































































"In 1584 and 1985, gross fixed capital formation equals gross capital formation •see Table il because changes in stocks
were included in private final consumption. See Csnjunnura Eccnomica, May 1987, p. 55.
Sources: Anuaric Estatisticc, Rio de Janeiro, 1986 p.453 and UK Industrial Statistics Yearbook, various issues: own cal-
culations.27
round about manner. The changes have happened parallel to in-
dustrialisation and rapid growth of the economy. The develop-
ment and structure of the Brazilian financial intermediation
and system have been described in several studies (World Bank,
1984; Teixeira da Costa, 1985; Coopers & Lybrand, 1987; etc.)
The Chart 1 indicates the structure of the financial system:
the types of financial assets are in the left-hand column. The
two-stage intermediation consisting of the monetary authorities
(Central Bank, BNH, BNDES) and the different groups of banks
and financial institutions, are given in the middle section.
The various types of fiscal borrowings are in the right-hand
column. The monetary authorities channel funds to the second
stage financial institutions and to the non-financial sector.
The BNDES and the Banco do Brazil are very significant credi-
tors (often at subsidised rate) to the manufacturing sector, as
well.
For the last two decades, the system which has emerged, has
been characterised by some principal trends such as:
nation-wide scope of banking,
segmentation,
concentration and development of financial conglomerates
embracing several types of specialised financial institu-
tions ,
1) Monetary Authority = Banco Central do Brasil (Centra_l Bank)
and Banco do Brazil; BNH = Banco Nacional de Habitacao (Na-
tional Housing Bank); BNDES = Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento
Economico e Social (National Economic and Social Development
Bank).• 28
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- significant role of official financial institutions,
- increased sophistication of financial intermediation mecha-
nism,
- the special role of monetary correction,
- credit subsidies according to economic policy preferences.
The most important features among them, as far as the manu-
facturing industries are concerned are the following:
(A) Segmentation: The financial market was originally segmented
and each kind of institution or group of institutions was ex-
clusively required to provide the financial needs for a certain
economic sector or activity. Differentiated mechanisms were
introduced in order to ensure an adequate flow of funds to
them. The legal regulations created a system in which not only
the borrower segments were designated to the financial institu-
tions but the financial assets, too. The required funds could
be exclusively raised through these assets by the financial
institutions.
This market segmentation originally went further than the
traditional separation between credit market and security
market activities. In the beginning this resulted in rather
monopolistic positions with respect to the sources of funding
and strictly regulated distribution systems.
Later, when financial conglomerates emerged under the leader-
ship of commercial banks, the clear cut edges of segments dis-
appeared. The banks and financial institutions started operat-30
ing in various parts of the market. The new development of the
financial system ended up with clustering among the dominating
commercial banks influenced by a high degree of government
intervention. The selective credit policy became the main
government policy.
(B) Concentration: During the 1970s, the financial system ex-
perienced a significant process of concentration. It was sup-
ported by the government. Large financial institutions merging
with small ones resulted in a drop of the number of commercial
banks (from 320 in 1965 to 107 in mid 1980s)
1). The activities
of the new financial conglomerates included almost every seg-
ment of the capital market (e.g. commercial banking, investment
banking, insurance and foreign trade). As a consequence, this
situation has undermined the competitive nature of financial
intermediation and has lead to additional undesirable alloca-
tion of financial resources because the special interlocks with
the industrial and commercial sectors have had adverse implica-
tions for the equality of access to credit.
1) The five biggest banks held approximately 53% of all demand
deposits in 1983. By the end of 1985 the Banco do Brasil domi-
nated the banking sector with $ 4.4 bn in deposits and loans of
$ 5.6 bn. Among the 30 largest banks ranked by the size of
deposits, there were 7 owned by either federal or state autho-
rities, a further 8 were foreign banks (e.g. Citibank with $
475.5 mn in deposit, Frances e Brasileiro with $ 294.5 mn and
Banco Sudameris, with deposits of $ 222.8 mn) and 15 banks were
privately owned (e.g. Banco Braziliero de Descontos (BRADESCO)
with deposit of $ 1.9 bn, Itan with deposit of 1.5 bn and Na-
cional with deposit of $ 0.9 bn. Besides them there were some
102 commercial banks in operation, of which 22 were foreign
owned or had foreign equity affiliation.31
(C) Role of the official financial institutions: Till the early
1970s, the official financial institutions were almost the only
sources of funds for investments in fixed assets (e.g. Banco do
Brasil, the BNDES mainly to the iron and steel industry, Saving
Bank, National Co-Operative Credit Bank, Brazilian Northeast
Bank, Rubber Credit Bank). This was so, because the liabilities
of commercial banks consisted essentially of demand deposits
therefore their lending had to be short-term by nature (Teixei-
ra da Costa, 1985). The importance of private banks has signi-
ficantly increased in the meantime but official financial in-
stitutions continue to dominate certain areas of financial
activities.
(D) Monetary correction: The monetary correction which was
to restore the public confidence in government bonds, became
generally used in virtually all contracts with a money value
and turned to be a quasi-currency in which now more than 80% of
financial assets were denominated. The persistence of monetary
correction - especially during the time of high inflation -
has impeded the development of the capital market by creating a
wide gap between the allocation of savings in short-term and
long-term non-monetary assets (Teixeira da Costa, 1985).
1) The most important means of monetary correction is the ORTN
(Indexed Treasury Bonds). Its officially set par value is ad-
justed in line with the inflation rate. Many different assets
and monetary contracts are corrected accordingly. The official
ORTN value is published monthly. Interest at the agreed rate is
to be added on top of monetary correction. A similar system of
correction was applied to all other financial instruments as
well. Fixed assets, securities, capital, reserves, etc. were
all subject to monetary correction for balance sheet presenta-
tion and tax purposes.32
The financial liabilities of the financial system consist of
voluntary and compulsory domestic financial savings with and
without monetary correction. In Chart 1 (p. 28) five types of
9 )
financial assets/liabilities are distinguished" : (a) compulso-
ry funds; (b) voluntary financial savings bearing monetary
correction; (c) uncorrected monetary assets; (d) money; and (e)
assets without contractually specified yields. The first three
types (a, b, c) are non-monetary assets and the forth includes
money narrowly defined as Ml. External resources in the form of
currency loans assumed an increasingly important supplementary
role to domestic sources of finance in the 1970-85 period.
Capital inflow was encouraged by high domestic interest rates.
The changes in the shares of monetary and non-monetary as-
sets in the total financial liabilities of financial system and
in the ratio to the GDP (Table 4) show the financial deepening
of the Brazilian economy. The decrease of monetary assets'
share by about 80% and the doubling of the non-monetary assets
during one and a half decades represent a rather outstanding
achievement. The significant increase in the share of non-mone-
tary assets was almost exclusively due to the very fast growth
of assets belonging to the indexed voluntary savings (group b).
It is an as obvious trend in a hyperinflationary economy as the
1) The groups of financial assets/liabilities: a) the compul-
sory funds (FGTS and PIS/PASEP); b) voluntary financial savings
bearing monetary correction (saving deposits, housing bonds,
ORTN and a part of time deposits); c) uncorrected non-monetary
assets (bills of exchange, LTN, and a part of time deposits);
d) money (demand deposits and cash) and e) assets without con-
tractually specified yields (mutual funds and equities).Table 4 - Distribution of Liabilities of the Brazilian Financial System (Data as Percentages), 1970-1985
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Monetary Assets
Currency 10.65 9.19 8.11 7.58 7.13 6.67 6.75 6.39 6.09 6.62 6.70 4.95
Demand Deposits 45.50 40.13 36.70 35.72 35.78 31.88 29.54 27.13 25.19 26.49 26.20 18'.74
























































































































































































TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total financial
liabilities in
value (bn Cr$) 76.3 113.7 160.2 245.4 342.0 544.3 823.0 1254.9 1810.1 2568.0 4341.2 10575.1 24039.8 68825.6 239742.6 941313.4
as % of GDP 33.4 38.0 44.1 49.4 47.5 53.9 52.7 53.3 52.5 42.5 34.3 42.7 49.9 58.2 61.8 66.9
Source: Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim Mensal, various issues and own calculations.
u>34
decline in the share of the assets without monetary correction
(group c). From the point of view of lending the increase in
share of indexed savings (group b) has to be rated favourably
since these assets are of longer term nature comparing to the
rather short term, non-indexed assets belonging to group c.
The main sources of credit to the manufacturing sector are
PIS/PASEP based on compulsory savings bearing monetary cor-
rections (group a), fiscal funds provided to the BNDES, and
various monetary authorities, especially ORTN/LTN which chan-
neled funds through the second stage (banks, financial institu-
tions) of financial intermediation. Banco do Brazil, besides
BNDES the second most important single lender of the industry
gets its financial funds from demand deposits. The demand depo-
sits are important sources of the commercial banks as well. The
investment banks and financial companies rely heavily on assets
without: monetary correction (time deposit and bills of ex-
change) for short term or working capital lending. The nature
of these sources can explain the high interest rates of lending
to the manufacturing industry.
1) PIS/PASEP = Programa de Integraeao Social (Program of
Social Integration) and Programa de Formacao do Patrimonio do
Servidor Publico (Public Employees Financial Reserve Funds).35
Direct lending by the three first-stage institutions (Cen-
tral Bank, Banco do Brazil, BNDES) accounted for 30% of the
total lending in 1978, while funds relent through second-stage
institutions amounted to 21%. The first-stage lenders' im-
portance and the dependence on them by the second-stage insti-
tutions were significant and increasing during the 1970s (World
Bank 1984, p. 13). The segmentation is far more pervasive and
individual markets are narrower than can be depicted by re-
source flow patterns. Thus, virtually all direct and indirect
lending of the first stage institutions is earmarked for in-
vestment narrowly specified by sector and purpose. About 90-95%
of all credit extended by official institutions towards the
commercial banking sector was regulated.
Credits by final lenders to the private sector declined
(Table. 5). Both the Banco do Brasil and the commercial banks
became less important sources of credit. The slow shift to the
non-monetary system was mainly due to the increase in the
shares of the federal and state savings banks and housing
credit corporations in total lending. These changes did not
significantly affect the structure of lending to the industrial
sector because, due to the segmentation, the share of the most
important lenders (commercial banks, BNDES, investment banks,
Banco do Brasil) in the total credits extended to the industry



























































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil and Banco Central do Brasil, Boletii Nensal, various issues; own calculations.37
3.3. Allocation of Credit
The main sources of credit extended by financial institu-
tions to private and public manufacturing industries are (1)
the commercial banks (approximately 35-40%), (2) the BNDES
system (with an increasing share in the 1980s from 20% to
40%), (3) the investment banks (with a decreasing share in the
1980s from 20% to 12%) and (4) the Banco do Brasil (with a
decreasing share from 15% to 7%). The credits extended by the
Banco do Brasil and investment banks were destined almost ex-
clusively and those by the commercial banks mainly to the pri-
vate sector. It was the BNDES only which followed a more ba-
lanced lending policy between private and public sectors.
Among the four above mentioned groups of credit institutions
the BNDES system is the most important source o± long term and
1) The BNDES System consists o± the BNDES itself, its
subsidiaries: FINAME and BNDESPAR (merged in 1982 from 3
subsidiaries: IBKASA, F1BASE, EMBRAMEL) [see Table Al ] . The
BNDES was originally organised with the purpose to manage
foreign capital invited by development policy to finance large
scale industrial projects for import substitution. The bank has
played a fundamental role in the diversification of Brazil's
industrial structure and in the expansion of its productive
infrastructure. The bank is the principal agent for long term
development lending and for such specific areas as energy or
import substitution programmes. It administers funds garnered
from compusory savings programmes and also furnishes working
capital loans to local, mainly national firms. Its activities
are supplemented by a number of development banks (e.g. espe-
cially the federally owned Banco Nordeste do Brasil, and Banco
da Amazonia). The substantial number of state financed
development banks provide loans mainly for specific local and
regional projects.38
very often subsidised credit to the whole industry . The affi-
liated commercial and investment banks, except when they act as
BNDES agents, lend regularly at short and medium term for work-
ing capital .-
The various manufacturing sectors benefited to a different
extent from the BNDES subsidised credits. The extent of subsi-
disation depends on the purpose and on the borrower. The share
of the metal industry in the credits given to the whole indus-
try first increased and then declined gradually between 1970
and 1985 (Table 6). The shares of the other surveyed industries
have been much smaller and generally declined or could increase
to a marginal extent only. These shares in lending reveal an
import substitution bias in the applied credit policy. As a
consequence, the availability of credit has become more limited
for the most efficient sectors, which has automatically driven
up interest rates on the free market.
1) This kind of concentration of longer term investment credits
is characteristic for the whole economy. Approximately half of
fund- and program lending by financial institutions has pro-
ceeded through state development banks, and roughly a third of
it through commercial banks. All lending included can be cate-
gorised as selective and most of them is highly subsidised. In
1978 the BNDES system total disbursement was equivalent to
approximately 40% of industrial, gross fixed capital formation.
The BNDES Annual Report 1978 estimated that supposing an aver-
age debt/equity ratio of about 1 - however this ratio has risen
from an average of 0.75 in 1970 to 1.40 in 1977 for the manu-
facturing industry (World Bank, 1984, p. 129) - the BNDES
System lending had been sufficient to supply about 80% of loan
requirement for industrial investment.39
Table 6 - Credits by che National Bank for Economic and Social Development iBHDES) to Brazilian Manufacturing














































































































































































































































































































;M Note: The figures for the textii industry are available between 1970-1974, but there are no figures of wearing
apparels•for the same period. From 1561 onwards the table contains the figures of non-durable consumption
goods in which both subsectors are included.
Sources: Anuaric Estatistico do Brasii: BNDES Annual Report, various issues and own calculations.40
The Banco do Brasil extended long term and short term cred-
it. Concerning long term credit (Table 7) the manufacturing
industry obtained 80-90% of the total disbursed amounts while
the shares of individual industries surveyed in this paper had
remained rather marginal. The situation of the manufacturing
industry was more favourable as far as the working capital by
the Banco do Brasil (Table 8) is concerned. Its share was,
almost for the whole time, between 70% and 80%. A significant
drop was only recorded in 1985. The six surveyed sectors to-
gether made up the 35-58% of the credit given to the manufac-
turing industry. A gradual decline their share stopped and
began to increase in 1980.
As far as the sectoral allocation of credit is concerned,
the metal industry got disproportionately larger shares from
both types of credits than any other sector. This could be
explained by the significant differences in capital intensity
among the sample sectors, but other reasons cannot be excluded
either (e.g. a significant part of the iron and steel industry
is state owned or controlled). This situation has forced other
industries to look for alternative sources of financing for
their operations.41















































































































































































































































































































































Sources: Anuaric Estatisticc do Brasil: Banco Centrai do Brasii, Bcietim Mensai, various issues and own calculations.42
lable S - Short Tern Credits by Banco do Brasil to Brazilian Manufacturing Industries in Current Millions of Cruzeiros and as Percent-
ages, 1570-1985
'/ear
Manufac- Metal * of Machi- t of Elect. * of Trans- % of Tex- % of Hearing % of Others '% of
curing *> of indus- nanuf. -nery nanuf. ciachi- manuf. pert manuf.tiles aanuf. apparel nanuf. nanuf.
Total




























































































































































































































































































Besides the manufacturing industries, total credits by Banco do Brasil include credits to lining, the trade sector and services.
Sources: Anuario Estatlstico do Brasil, various issues and own calculations.43
3.4. Allocation of Equity
The Brazilian financial authorities have tried to support
the financial consolidation of companies by promoting equity
t r a ding' . Tn spite of an increase in new shares and deben-
2 )
Lures comparatively few companies have gone public. The Bra-
zilian manufacturing industries still substantially rely on
internal funding (retained profit) or borrowing (see Table A3).
Many of the major Brazilian companies do not issue shares for
public acquisition at all or if they do so family interest are
represented by the majority shareholders holding over 50% of
the equity.
The number of companies which have opted for issuing stocks
is rather smal1, especially if the following facts are taken
into consideration: Compared to the other developing countries
Brazil has a highly diversified economy; in 1986 barely 900 out
1) A series of policy measures has since 1964 attempted to
facilitate the capitalisation and opening of Brazilian enter-
prises, a) Fiscal incentives: Law 4728 of 1965 income tax de-
duction for 30% of the value of new shares purchased and for
15%. of mutual fund purchases and income and withholding tax
exception. Decree Law 157 of Febr. 1967 income tax deduction
for mutual funds share certificate, b) Subsidised credit for
equity purchase and underwriting: BNDES System (PROCAP and
FINAC) schemes to support underwriting and equity purchases, c)
Laws for protection of minority shareholders.
2) During the period between 1966 and 1985 the combined volume
of stock grew at an average annual real rate of 30%. The value
of new shares and debentures increased at an average annual
real rate of 27.4% and 7.8% respectively (Coopers & Lybrand,
1987, p. 24).44
of 1.7 million individual companies were listed and only half
of them take a relatively active part in the stock and deben-
tures markets (Teixeira da Costa, 1985; Coopers & Lybrand,
1987).
A survey on 90 companies (roughly 1/10 of the listed ones)
has assessed the sources of their funding (Table 9). In the
private sector the internal funding played the most important
role, and the respective share further increased in 1978-1982.
In the public sector internal funding declined. Borrowing was
substantial in both groups.
During the period under observation stock issues were a much
less important source of funds. Their share in total financing
declined for the private sectors and was rather stable but low
for the public sector . This result is understandable in the
case of private companies with foreign ownership only. For
them, the government policy has provided incentives to raise
money from abroad. The Brazilian companies had to face regula-
tions preventing companies placing their equity shares directly
with the public. The issue of stocks is controlled by the fi-
nancial system because an intermediary financial institution is
legally required to oversee all these financial activities.
1) The BNDES also subscribes to equity. The purchase and pro-
motion of equity have accounted for about 5-10% of its total
disbursement (World Bank, 1984). The real importance of it lies
in the process of capitalisation and equity strengthening of
national enterprises in an economy where the manufacturing
industry is, mainly because of traditions, still reserved to-
wards going public.45
Table 9 - Sources of Funding: 90 Open or Publicly-Quoted Brazilian Corpora-

































































































































Source: IBMEC, in: R. Teixeira da Costa, 1985, p. 14.46
Analysis suggest (World Bank, 1984, p. 131-132) that the
bulk of total market value and trading volume has resulted from
equities of a few majority state owned enterprises. Individual
minority shareholders invested little in equity of private
Brazilian industrial companies. Thus, the equity market was
worse than is apparent from aggregate statistics. Factors other
than stockmarket structure and subsidised industrial credit
also contributed to the failure of the equity market to mobi-
lise a greater portion of gross domestic financial savings.
Among them, one of the most important could be the combination
of the availability of liquid, indexed financial assets and the
channelling of credit towards real estate, housing and related
investments . The equity market became a victim of the seg-
mented structure of the Brazilian financial market, i.e. the
diversion of funds to alternative assets and the substitution
of industrial borrowing on a free capital market by subsidised
state funds.
1) See relevant data of Housing Credit Co and BNH in Table 5.4 7
4. Sources of Capital and Credit for the Brazilian Manufacturing
Industries
4.1 Internal and External Savings
The sources of the gross capital formation were varying
during the period 1970-85. However, the major part of capital
formation was provided from domestic sources (Table 10). Until
1975 th© gross national savings represented an increasing share
in GDP. Following the first oil shock and capital abundance on
the international capital markets during the second half of the
1970s, the share of domestic savings in GDP started to fall gra-
dually. Gross national savings were increasingly made up of pri-
vate savings. The federal enterprises contributed to the domestic
saving to a relatively large extent. The various levels of gov-
ernment played very different roles. Over the period, their total
contribution was declining and by the mid 1980s, it became nega-
tive.
To increase aggregate domestic saving, incentives based
purely on high real interest rates were not sufficient in the
situation prevailing in Brazil in the 1980s. Interest rates have
been high but have not resulted in the necessary higher aggregate
savings because, as evidence showed, the high interest rates (1)
increase the public sector deficit, (2) raise the cost of working
capital, and (3) discourage private investment (Zini 1988). Thus,48
Table 10 - Gross National Savings iSources of Gross Capital Formation! of Brazil in Current Millions of Cruzeiros and as
% Of GOF. 1970-1965
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 197S
19S0 1961 1922 1953 1984 1985
Gross national savings
as % of GDP
private
as * of GOF
federal enterprises
as % of GOF
government
3S % of GOP
federal
as * of GDP
state
as * of GOP
municipal

















































































as * of GDP
private
as * of GDF
federal enterprises
as * of GDF
government
as % of GDF
federal
as * of GDF
state
as % of GOF
municipal













































































































































"'"Aggregate of private and federal enterprise savings.
Sources: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil 1986, P. 453 and L.A. Correa do Lago et.
al., P. 80 and C.A. Longo, P. 184 and own calculations.49
market incentives to increase the saving ratio could not yield
significant results. It is particularly unfavourable, that the
market for long-term financial assets is actually nonexistent and
that the high real interest rates inhibit investment in the face
of uncertainty about inflation.
External savings became increasingly important after the
first oil shock. The availability of external financing at rela-
tively low interest rates covered the potential external gap and
helped to sustain growth. The share of external savings in GDP
was fluctuating; nevertheless it became 5 times higher by the
early 1980s than it had been at the beginning of the 1970s (Table
11) .
After 1982, the debt crisis reduced the flow of foreign
capital and led to a drying up of these sources in subsequent
years. The high interest rates on international capital markets
and the recession in the industrialised world hit the Brazilian
economy with double force. The situation became severe because
the direction of capital flows turned around. Outflow of capital
took place just at a time when the Brazilian economy badly needed
new capital both to finance the debt service and to urgently
carry out the economic adjustment process postponed in previous
years. The conditions became very unfavourable to Brazil because
the domestic savings were not sufficient when interest rates for
external savings increased significantly and there was a sharp
decline in the availability of these external sources.50
Table 11 - External Savings of Brazil in Current










































































Note: By definition the external and internal
savings ratios (tables 10,11) have to
add up to the calculated gross capital
formation ratios in Table 1.
Source: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil, 1986,
p. 451-453.51
4.2 Indebtedness - Public Debt, Foreign Debt
During the 1970s, the Central Government Budget always
showed surpluses. These accounted for between 0.5 and 3.5% of
GDP. After 1980, there were public deficits which reached about
10% of GDP in 1985 (IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook,
var. iss.). Analyses of the central authorities' financial per-
formance show an even more unfavourable picture. The balances of
Consolidated Central Government Accounts and that of the Conso-
lidated General Government Accounts (Table 12) were almost always
negative and the deficit of both accounts exceeded 10 % of GDP by
1985.
It should be pointed out, that even the Central Government
Budget surpluses in the 1970s have, little meaning if they are
considered in isolation. One has to look at these three accounts
simultaneously with the federal debt records. The amount of this
debt increased incessantly. The total federal debt in bonds and
bills grew from 5.2 % of GDP to 28.6 % of GDP over the 1970-1985
period (Table 13). . -
The forms of the federal debt were very frequent LTN and
ORTN issues. Until 1979, this increase was brought about mainly
by expanded LTN issues. As soon as the inflation rate had jumped
up and indexation got vital importance the ORTN issues took over
the dominant role in financing the deficit (Table 13).52
Table 12 - Consolidated General Government Accounts of
Brasil at Year Ending in Current Billions of





















































































1984 115924.0 138147.0 -22223.0 -5.73
1985 467382.0 646527.0 -179145.0 -12.74
Note: Consolidated General Government Accounts = Conso-
lidated Central Government Accounts + State and
Local Government Accounts
Sources: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1987,
p. 201; IMF, IFS Supplement on Government Finance
1986, p. 105 and own calculations.53









































































































































il market instruments ta finance the
fur 35 days. Its interest
bought by commercial banks (as part of legai
































































Total Federal Debt in









































used for short term
. ORTN is used for long term
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Sources: Banco Central do Brasil, Boletus Hensal, various issues and own calculations; Conjuntura Economica No. 2, p. 184.54
The government bonds have some peculiarities that make them in-
flationary instruments
A significant part of the debt was in the hands of public
sector institutions. This practice, therefore, served to redis-
tribute resources within the public sector toward the monetary
authorities for relending, primarily to agriculture and substan-
tially to industry. The issues of treasury bonds and bills served
to dry up excessive liquidity arising from the expansion in sub-
sidised credit programs and the inflow of foreign resources. The
increased government demand for credit had the effect of driving
up domestic market interest rates, thus crowding other borrowers
out of the limited unregulated domestic financial market.
The increasingly higher interest rates attracted foreign
capital inflows, leaving the net effect of domestic debt issue to
be an increase in official domestic liabilities paralleled by a
rise in official foreign assets and non-official foreign indebt-
edness. Portfolio switches occurred between official and non-
official institutions as well as between domestic and foreign as-
set/liability positions. The costs of monetary policy were, thus,
borne first and foremost by those borrowers lacking access to
government's subsidised credits and foreign loans.
1) Treasury bonds are indexed to the General Price Index and are
held as very short term assets. The 2-3 day applications are
typical. These bonds are near-money with almost full liquidity
and they pay interest. The bond issues to finance government
deficits push interest rates up but do not reduce liquidity in
the economy because these bonds can be used to repay debts at
financial institutions.55
4.3 Effects of Monetary Policy
The Brazilian monetary system is a very peculiar one. A
special institutional arrangement enables the government to
bypass the conventional fiscal budget. Furthermore, the monetary
system contains built-in bias toward the expansion of money
supply. The federal government has the authority to print money
to finance its deficit and also to extend subsidised loans. This
authority can be exercised independently of Congressional appro-
val. Given these conditions, inflation is hard to prevent.
Over the period 1970-85, the Brazilian monetary policy was
characterised by short cycles of contractionary and expansionary
episodes. The assets of the monetary authorities frequently ex-
panded more rapidly than their monetary liabilities. They usually
exceeded the projected monetary budget expansion and led to an
increase in the monetary base. As a result, inflationary pres-
sures aggravated. During the 1970s, the continued growth of the
monetary base was rather attributed to foreign capital inflows
and to special extra-budgetary activities of the government.
1) Over time three different public budgets evolved in Brazil.
There is the common fiscal budget, proposed by the executive and
passed by Congress. In addition, there are the consolidated
budget of state enterprises and the monetary budget. This latter
is often called as the program for the monetary base which re-
flects the activities of the Central Bank and the Banco do Brasil
which is a commercial state bank. This bank has no reserve re-
quirements and its monetary liabilities are part of the monetary
base. As information on total revenues and expenditures of the
public sector are not available, the overall balance can only be
obtained from the government's borrowing from domestic and for-
eign sources.56
The Brazilian government usually tried to curb the inflation
by tightening the monetary policy and implementing sterilisation
measures. These included higher compulsory reserves for the com-
mercial banking system and a higher proportion of reserves to be
held in foreign currency. These measures represented attempts to
sterilise expansion of the monetary base arising from capital
inflows and subsidised credit expansion. The effects were a con-
traction of demand deposits available for free lending and an
upward pressure on free market interest rates.57
5. Credit Terms for the Manufacturing Industries
5.1. Credit Availability
The Brazilian government intervention in the banking system
has grown alongside with ownership concentration and was general-
ly related to two priorities: determining credit allocation and
managing public debt. As a result of government intervention only
40% of demand deposits were available for unregulated lending
(World Bank 1984, p. XVI). This segmentation of the financial
system has resulted in widely differing interest rates. Basically
there are two categories: market determined and subsidised inter-
est rates.
Credits to the manufacturing sectors were extended at subsi-
dised or market terms as well. Due to the wide range of govern-
ment involvement into the lending policy and to theinterest rate
preferences provided for certain development and economic policy
targets, there were significant differences in credit availabi-
lity and credit terms depending upon the sector, purpose, region
and nature of the borrower (Table 14). By the end of 1970, the
annual interest rate differentiales between different segments of
the credit market amounted to over 70%
1) Type of lending and its average interest rate in 1978 (Cen-
tral Bank guesstimates): relending of funds supplied by the Cen-
tral Bank 7.0; to exports, and associated rediscounts 8.0; to
agriculture 12.7; industrial lending including BNDES direct and
indirect loans 28.5; discounts of Bankers' Acceptances 36.0;
funds borrowed abroad through Resolution 63 59.7; personal loans
60.0; working capital (raised through time deposits and bills of
exchange) 61.0; BNH and SFH loans, directly and through financial
institutions 65.0; not identified 65.0; total 43.7 (World Bank,
1984, p. 41).58
Table 14 - Characteristics of Credits to the Brazilian Manufacturing Industries at Special Subsidised and Market
Terms, 1970-1985
Lander Sources of Money Functions Sectors
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(1984).60
5.1.1. Subsidised Credit
The volumes of highly subsidised credit and estimates of
the subsidy element inherent in low of the interest rates are
2 ) given in Table A5 . The subsidies amounted to about 130 billion
Cr$ in 1977 and roughly 190 billion CR$ in 1978 and accounted for
about 5.5% of GDP or about 45-55% of public revenues in each
year.
The credit subsidies had two main sources. About 80 % of the
subsidies came directly from the monetary authorities. The other
1) Over 1/3 of the outstanding balance of loans to the private
sector was highly subsidised (World Bank, 1984, p. 27).
2) The large volume of slightly subsidised credit originating
from negative real remuneration of compulsory savings and savings
deposits is not included. Because of the multitude of special
lines of subsidised credit and programs and the dependence of the
subsidy component upon loan maturity, the precise computation of
the subsidy over a given period is not feasible.
Table 5 presents the annualised values of the subsidy flows im-
plicit in selected financial balances at the end of 1977 and
1978. The subsidy is calculated as estimated average interest
rate minus "base" interest rate. The base rate at which the in-
terest subsidy is assumed to be zero is ideally an average rate
which would prevail in the absence of credit subsidies and capi-
tal market segmentation. The free interest rates are volatile and
frequently far above reasonable levels for a unified market be-
cause of narrow free capital markets and savings earmarked for
lending at negative real interest rates. The marginal cost of
foreign funds can provide a plausible estimate of the base rate
(1.5% p.a. for 1977 and 3.0% p.a. for 1978). These rates corre-
spond to the yield on 91 day LTNs are equivalent to real interest
rates of -2.7% for 1977 and 3.1% for 1978. This method does not
provide indication of the subsidy component of individual loans
because the balance could be made up of short-term loans with
small subsidy or highly subsidised long-term loans.61
major source was the commercial banks but this subsidy was fi-
nanced actually in an indirect way by the monetary authorities
as well. Concerning subsidy recipients about 60% of the total
subsidy was directed to agriculture and almost 40% to industry
while the share of financial institution was below 5%.
The general influence of the interest rate subsidies is not
easy to evaluate. Subsidy effects are overshadowed by the in-
fluence of protectionist policies which are supposed to be offset
by the subsidies, and the impact of market instability brought
about by controls of prices, imports and exports. Furthermore,
the fungibility of money means that subsidised credit has been
used, to replace rather than supplement funds from other sources.
Other adverse macroeconomic effects of subsidised lending include
uncontrolled monetary expansion, destabilising tendencies, high
market interest rates, and increasing public debt.
The most important subsidised credit schemes were designed
for agriculture, export promotion and development of small - and
medium sized companies (Table 15). Interest rate subsidies were
to compensate these sectors for the adverse consequences of price
1) It happened through concessions on the composition of re-
serves held by the banks. The annualised loss of seigniorage to
the monetary authorities from reserve holdings in ORTNs rather
than in non-interest bearing balances was approximately Cr$ 10.6
bn at the end of 1977 and Cr$ 14.0 bn at the end of 1978. Seigni-
orage was lost on reserves held in ORTNs because these bear in-
terest and monetary correction. In addition to this a portion of
the subsidy was paid in the form of increased interest payments
on federal debt brought about by the increase in free interest
rates. Causality between subsidy and level of free interest rates
can be found.62
Table 15 - Special (Subsidized) Credit Schemes in Brazil, 1970-1985
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Legal requirements of minimum proportion of deposits to lend in rural credits at
subsidized interest rates. Small banks: 10%; medium banks: 20%; large banks: 30%. -
"The subsidisation of the interest rates depends on the level of development of
each region, e.g. the interest rate is 10% in the more developed^southern areas,
3-8% in the less developed areas of the north and north east. - Total FINEX fi-
nancing through these schemes covers around 1/4 of Brazilian's exports of manufac-
tures.
Sources: See Table 16.63
controls and exchange rate overvaluation. Several studies (using
linear programing and production function analysis) analysed the
productivity of capital inputs in agriculture. The results fre-
quently suggested underemployment of invested capital . Other
research revealed that farms' annual expenses and investment on
average represented about 2/3 of the total funds available from
credit and own funds (Araujo-Meyer, 1978). The interest rates
were distorted by fixing agricultural loan rates lower than those
permitted for other loans. The real interest rate for loans to
agriculture have been negative. Similarly, the export credit
schemes were not free of adverse results either. A study by Brow-
der (1987) described how trading companies could enhance their
profits through the lucrative circulation of their subsidised
2 ) funds in the commercial short-term', money market . Since the
public sector financial institutions supply a large proportion of
both of these funds the general public bears actually the cost of
the massive resource drain implied by the schemes.
The size of subsidised credit extended to manufacturing
industries has been much less significant than that of the other
schemes. The main source of. long term credit at favourable terms
1) The ratio of agricultural credit subsidies to the value of
agricultural production increased steadily. Most of the subsidy
was directed to export crops, but they appeared to have been
insufficient to compensate exchange rate overvaluation and other
controls (World Bank 1984, p. 30).
2) Credit extended to the exporters was either longer term
than they actually needed or the working capital circulation took
shorter time than was supposed by the subsidised credit scheme.
This idle capital was used on the short-term money market to gain
extra profit. ,.64
to industry has been the BNDES system. The average, seemingly not
highly subsidised terms conceal considerable disparities in spe-
cific cases. The scope of credit and the extent of the subsidy
have been gradually reduced by revising the former very low pre-
fixed monetary correction in 1978. Certain schemes (e.g. lending
for technological development and public sector company loans)
have, however, maintained their very favourable credit terms. The
"negative spread" of BNDES credits was covered by Central Bank
financing.
5.1.2. Credit at Market Rates
Usually short-term credits are extended at market interest
rates because little long term lending takes place on the free
capital market. Regular roll-over of short term credits is the
very usual and expensive way of converting short term credits
into longer term ones (Table 16).
The free market rates rose relatively steadily. They did so
especially after the debt crisis. This increase in interest rates
was caused by soaring inflation, growing reserve requirements for
subsidised lending and constraint on the volume of resources
available for unrestricted lending (Table 17).
The Central Bank bill rate (LBC) is generally accepted as
the key indicator for shorter term papers. LBC interest rates
have tended to keep pace with the inflation rate with a lag of65
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'Effective' figures include nomina
1973 = not available. -
2. interest rate plus tariffs plus taxes plus commissions plus reciprocities. - 1970-
Resolution 63: Foreign borrowings by commercial, investment and development banks, which are then
on-lent. At the time of introduction in the 1960s, the on-lending terms had to be identical to those agreed with the foreign
lenders. The Brazilian banks could simply earn a commission. Greater flexibility is now allowed. Long term foreign borrowings
are widely used to finance short term lending, often for periods as short as 90 days. Loans are usually either rolled over or
immediately re-lent to another client. The bank has to bear the exchange risk. Any amounts not on-lent have to be deposited
with the Central Bank. - Commercial banks have to lend minimum proportions of deposits to smaller companies at subsidised
interest rates. The proportions vary according to the banks' size categorisation
small banks (demand deposits up to 9 million HS$) 161 of deposits
medium banks (demand deposits 8-38 million US $) 141 of deposits
r large banks (demand deposits over 31 million 0S$) 12* of deposits
The financial system trades actively in LTNs and ORTN/OTNs, but raises finance domestically mainly through savings deposits
and time deposits in the form of non-transferable accounts (RDB's) or negotiable certificates of deposits (CDB = Certificate
of Deposits of Bankers) or non-interest bearing demand deposits, and acceptance bills (LC - Letras de Ca"mbio).
Source: Cenirios, Ano II, No. 14 Set p. 14-15.67
•around 2 weeks. Real LBC yields (adjusted by the IPCA/INPC index)
have generally been very small. It is typically in a range up to
0.5% per month, but averaging only about 0.2%.
Bank CD rates fluctuate in line with inflation. In real
terms they are generally 1-2% per month, averaging about 1.5%,
equivalent to a real annual return of 20%. Assets whose value can
be fully inflation adjusted via the ORTN have far lower nominal
yields. The rates of these assets are linked rather more closely
to international rates, but the expected depreciation in the real
currency rate is taken into account as well. The severe indebt-
edness of the country means that the link with world money market
rates is never a close one.
As most subsidised credit has been conceded at fixed nominal
interest rates the gap between them and free interest rates has
widened . While this is the case, most credit subsidies have re-
sponded usually soon and positively to any increase in inflation
or rising free interest rates. Tn the case of some major subsi-
dised credit programs these changes have taken place very slowly.
Foreign liabilities rapidly increased their share in the
total debts of the financial system during the 1970s: it was
reduced after the debt crisis but has still remained significant.
By the early 1980s, foreign loans accounted for more than 1/3 of
total bank liabilities which was roughly equal to the loans ex-
tended to the private sector.68
The availability of foreign funds did actually cause lending
rates to fall and to remain relatively low till the raid 1970s.
Then, the trend turned back and especially after the debt crisis
lending rates reached very high levels (Table 17). The changes in
lending rates were influenced by a combination of s. vera.l fac-
tors. The Eurodollar rates (LIBOR) and the US Prime rate went
through several up and down phases (Table 18). The spread on
loans . to Brazil has been rising from around 0.5-0.75% in early
1980 to 2.5-3% by mid 1980. The indebtedness has deteriorated the
general creditworthiness of the country. The rate of devaluation
particularly against the dollar has been accelerated basically to
match inflation. Exchange risk has increased the cost of foreign
borrowing especially after the two maxi-devaluation in 1979 and
1983. As a result, the real average interest rate paid by the
country on net debt increased from negative to very high positive
levels in 1978 (Table 18).
5.2. Equity Supply
In the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion of capital markets was
influenced in contra- dictory ways. It was enhanced by the usual-
ly high level of real interest rates, especially in the 1980s,
and by demand for corporate issues stimulated not only by the
performance of listed companies but also by government poli-69
Table 18 - Effective Interest Rates on Net Foreign Debt of Brazil, US Prime
Rate and LIBOR, 1970-1985
Years
Nominal Average Real Average
Interest Rate Interest Ra^e






















































































Computed as the ratio of interest payments over net debt of previous year.
- ^Computed as (1 + r) / (1 + p
x), where r is the average interest rate and
x 3
p' is the rate of change in dollar export prices. - LIBOR - London Inter-
bank Offer Rate. The figures are in nominal term. They were negative in
real term between 1973 and 1975.
Sources: C.L. Martone (1987), p. 23; Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim Men-
sal, Vol. 24, 1988/5, p. 487.70
cies . The acceleration of stock exchange activities was bol-
stered considerably by the government policy of promoting private
sector investment and the attempt to reduce government deficits
9 )
and indebtedness through privatisation" .
The government deficit increasing since the early 1970s had
an adverse effect on stock prices. Since the public debt pushes
up the interest rates on bonds, i.e. the opportunity cost of
holding capital, stock prices fall in response. Falling prices
are the short run effect of crowding out
The high inflation rate may affect stock markets, but shares
provide, in principle, certain defences against infalation, since
they represent real assets. Evidence shows that shares could in
fact provide a hedge against inflation. The share prices, have on
1) The government intervened to reverse the downward trends in
trading volumes and stock prices by making government funds
available to improve market liquidity and by increasing the in-
stitutional funds channelled into the market and by granting tax
incentives to stockholders in publicly-quoted companies. Certain
sectors of the economy were required by the government to invest
part of their funds in shares and debentures. This policy aimed
at widening the equity base of companies via institutional in-
vestors and providing an increasing flow of funds through the
capital market.
2) Shares of companies ownt 1 by BNDES and other federal enti-
ties were sold to the public.
3) In the long run public debt will crowd out productive capi-
ta] and increase its marginal productivity. Therefore the long
run effect on stock prices is ambiguous.71
average, been givings returns higher than the changes in infla-
tion rates or in the value of ORTN as the following accumulated
changes of share prices (in % of annual averages between 1974 and
1984 demonstrate
1':
IBOVESPA IBV IPBV IGP-DI ORTN
42,067.23 31,541.54 40,020.00 36,786.08 14,785.11
Source: Teixeira da Costa, 1985, p. 103.
5.3. Effects of Inflation and Taxation
Among the economic policy factors determining interest rates
the subsidised credit policy can be mentioned as one with impor-
tant effect, because initially the subsidies were financed by
money creation. The long time prevailing view that subsidised
credit eases inflationary pressure by lowering financial costs to
borrowers, ignores the consequences of credit subsidies for mone-
tary expansion and excessive demand, thereby inflation and high
real free interest rates and shortening borrowing terms. The
inflation and high free interest rates are associated but the
causality has run predominantly from inflation to interest rate
levels. The supplementing of domestically raised resources by
official funds and foreign loans has actually undercut the effec-
tiveness of free rates in reducing demand and pressure on prices.
1) IBOVESPA = Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index; IBV = Rio de
Janeiro Stock Exchange Index; IPBV = Rio de Janeiro Stock Ex-
change Price Index; IGP-DI = General Price Index.72
Corporate profitability increased since the time of the late
1960s, and early 1970s when a series of changes and adjustment to
2 ) inflation was made in the tax system. Generally, the corporate
taxes are at a level comparable with many other countries. The
two main taxes are: corporate income tax and withholding taxes on
dividends and interests. The standard rate of corporate income
tax is 35%. Dividends and interest payments to individuals are
taxed at 23-25%. There are some other additional charges on in-
come e.g. municipal service tax and PIS (Social Integration Pro-
gram) t Edwards 1988, p. 107 and Coopers & Lybrand 1987, p. 63).
1) The excessive consumption demand created by rural credit sub-
sidies played an important role in the failure of the Cruzado
Plan.
2) E.g. annual indexation of book value of property and plant,
the effect of inflation on working capital was taken into
consideration in determining taxable profit, income tax rate
changed at source on dividends paid by publicly quoted companies,
etc.73
6. Capital Costs in Brazil's Manufacturing Industries
6.1. Rate of Return on Equity
In 1970-1985, the pre-tax rate of return on equity for the
entire sample fluctuated (Table 19). In one sector (iron & steel)
the downward trend in aggregate profitability was prevailing. In
two sectors (electrical engineering and textiles), there was an
increase. The decrease or increase in the other sectors depended
on the incidence of cost inflation and other cyclical factors.
Chart 2 shows the changes in profitability of the manufac-
turing sectors between the beginning and the end of the period.
The sectors are represented by black points which are placed
according to the vertical axis measuring the profitability in
1970 and horizontal axis measuring the profitability in 1985.
Manufacturing sectors represented in the upper right corner had
high rates of return in both years. The lower right corner im-
plies an improving position of rates of return because the pro-
fitability in 1985 was higher than in 1970. In the case of sec-
tors in the lower left corner the rates of return were always low
and they actually deteriorated further.
To analyse these data i.e: the difference between the rate
of return on capital invested and the effective interest rate,
the so-called leverage has to be calculated. The rate of return
on equity is a part of the rate of return on total capital. Their
1) The rate of return is calculated as the ratio of total net
profit to the total net equity.74
Table 19 - Rate of Return on Equity, of Stockholders (Before Tax) in the Brazilian
Manufacturing Industries as %, 1970-1985
1970 1975 1979 1985
Iron & Steel
average ratio of the sample
average ratio of the state
owned companies
- median




average ratio of the sample
(private and foreign companies)
ratio of the median company
Machinery
average ratio of the sample
(private and foreign companies)
ratio of the median company
Electrical Machinery/Elec-
tronics
average ratio of the sample
(private and foreign companies)
ratio of the median company
Texti ].es
average ratio of the sample
(private and foreign companies)
ratio of the median company
Footwear
average ratio of the sample
(private and foreign companies)


















































































Ratio is calculated as the ratio of net profits (after monetary correction and be-
fore tax) to net equity (realised social capital plus reserves plus accumulated
profit minus accumulate^ losses) of stockholders, data from the data of the largest
Brazilian companies.- "Calculated from values of only 2 companies.
Sources: Visao 1971, 1976, 1980, 1986 (August) and own calculations.75
Chart 2
Cross-time illustration of rates of return of the Brazilian manufacturing
























1. Average ratio of iron & steel sector
2. Average ratio of state-owned iron & steel companies
3. Ratio of the median state-owned iron & steel company
4. Average ratio of private iron & steel companies
5. Ratio of the median private iron & steel company
6. Average ratio of automobile sector
7. Ratio of median automobile company
8. Average ratio of machinery sector
9. Ratio of median machinery company
10. Average ratio of electrical/electronics sector
11. Ratio of median electrical/electronics sector
12. Average ratio of textile sector
13. Ratio of median textile company
Source: Table 2276
difference depends on the leverage and the debt equity ratio
Because of the lack of sufficient data a full scale of evaluation
cannot be made. It is well known, if the leverage factor is
small, addition- al debt financing cannot help to stem the tide
of decreasing profitability of total capital. If interest rates
rise as a result of accelerating inflation and the profitability
of capital decreases, then, the changes in leverage reduce the
rate of return on equity. The higher the debt equity ratio, the
more severe is this negative leverage effect. Some dominating
factors can be mentioned which affect the development of the rate
of return besides competition, management decisions and taxation,
namely financial risk and interest rates.
The financial risk is the risk associated with high debt fi-
nancing. The wide spread of return on equity among sectors can be
brought about by varying leverage, i.e. by different debt equity
ratios. Interest payments on debt have to be made regardless of
the development of profitability of total capital. However, cred-
it subsidies reduce this effect. Through higher nominal interest
rates or shorter amortisation periods creditors can successfully
protect their credits from erosion by inflation. Therefore, the
rates of return of sectors are influenced by shares of lending at
subsidised and free market interest rates as well.
1) NRE = NRT + (NRT - EIR) DER, where
NRE - nominal rate of return on equity
NRT = nominal rate of return on total capital
EIR = effective interest rate
DER = debt equity ratio
NRT-EIR = leverage77
6.2. Effective Cost of Borrowing
The effective cost of borrowing can be obtained as the ratio
of interest payment (IE) to average debt outstanding (B) on which






and the after-tax cost of debt is
(10) kb = (1-T)(IEt/Bt).
The effective tax rate (T) can be obtained as ratio of tax
payments and before tax earnings. Our calculated tax rate figures
are realistic since the corporate income tax is 35% (Section
5.3).
The results of calculations of real effective after-tax cost
of debt vary widely among manufactirung industries (Table 20).
The widest gap is between the cost of debt for textiles and iron
& steel industries. The almost fourfold difference was mainly the
result of the significant amounts of subsidised credits extended
to the iron & steel industry.78










































Calculated as ratio of ^interest paid to debt from data of
Conjuntura Econoraica. - "Calculated from before tax earnings
and paid tax figures published in Anuario Economico Fiscal,
various issues. - Machinery and automobile are in the same
groups. - Includes clothes and garments.
Sources: Conjuntura Econoraica, Oct. 1981, July 1988; Anuario
Economico Fiscal, various issues; own calculations.79
7. Conclusion
The analysis has shown that in the period 1970-1985 cost of
capital in the Brazilian manufacturing industries were directly
and indirectly affected by several factors. They can be summa-
rised as it follows:
1. The share of total investment in the GDP has, since early
1980s, fallen gradually. It was basically the consequence of two
factors, the external debt and the public sector deficit. The
share of the manufacturing industries in the total gross fixed
capital formation tended to decline. An increasing part of the
value added produced in the manufacturing sectors was used for
other purposes than investment or was invested in other sectors
of the economy. Among the manufacturing sectors an uneven situa-
tion developed. While the share of iron and steel sector in total
investment increased, first of all the textile and then the elec-
tronic machinery and machinery sectors were discernibly worse off
among the surveyed sectors.
2. A special structure of financial system has developed in the
course of the last three decades. It was characterised by some
principal trends like: segmentation of the financial market,
concentration of the financial institutions, monetary correction.
The financial liabilities/assets - consisting of voluntary and
compulsory domestic financial savings - as well as monetary and
non-monetary assets were highly regulated. Thus, the flows of
funds were very often predetermined. In particular, lending80
manufacturing sectors was bearing relatively high interest rates
compared to the other economic activities.
3. The main sources of loans to manufacturing industry were
banks and official credit institutions. The BNDES (subsidised)
credit policy was rather conservative. Access to credit was li-
mited for the more efficient sectors which automatically drove
the market interest rates up by the increasing credit demand on
the free market. The Banco do Brasil extended rather working
capital than long term loans to the manufacturing industries. The
sector structure of credit allocation showed disproportionately
larger shares from both types of credits in favour of the metal
industry.
4. Inspite of government promotion to expand equity trading
comparatively few companies have gone public. The manufacturing
industries traditionally rely to a great extent on internal fund-
ing or borrowing. Moreover, due to the credit subsidies, direct
allocation of credits, indexed financial assets, etc. the equity
market became a victim of the segmented financial system. The
equity market failed to mobilise a greater portion of gross do-
mestic financial savings.
5. The major part of capital formation was always provided from
domestic sources although the ratio of gross national savings to
GDP decreased significantly between 1970 and 1983. To increase
aggregate domestic savings by incentives based purely on rela-
tively high interest rates proved to be ineffective. The high81
interest rates increased the public sector deficit, raised the
cost of working capital, and discouraged private investment.
6. External savings became increasingly important but after the
debt crisis the flows of foreign credit was reduced. The interest
rates of the 1970s from relatively low, often negative levels
increased very fast to high levels in the early 1980s, making
foreign borrowing very expensive.
7. Available loanable funds have, especially since 1980, been
reduced by the increasing public deficit and public borrowing.
The total federal debt grew fivefold between 1970 and 1985. As a
consequence of the crowding out effect interest rates were fur-
ther increasing.
8. The Brazilian monetary system enabled the government to
bypass the conventional fiscal budget. The built-in bias allowed
the expansion of money supply by printing money to finance the
budget deficit and by extending subsidised loans. The monetary
policy was not effective enough to curb the fast increasing in-
flation rate. It brought about contraction in free lending and
upward pressure on market interest rates.
9. The Brazilian government intervention in banking in favour
of social priorities resulted in widely differing interest rates.
Basically there were two categories: market determined and subsi-
dised interest rates. The most important subsidised credit
schemes were designed for agriculture, export promotion and de-
velopment of small and medium sized companies. They had several82
adverse effects, especially on the manufacturing industry which
had to rely on free market borrowing. Among the adverse effects
are the impact on the functioning of the capital market and the
upward pressure on the prevailing free market interest rates.
10. The expansion of capital markets was influenced in contra-
dictory ways. The stock prices were adversely affected by the
high interest rates due to the government deficit financing. The
inflation had relatively small effects on equity financing be-
cause the shares could provide a hedge against it.
11. The calculated rate of return on equity for the entire
sample fluctuated. The downward trend in aggregate profitability
is mirrored basically in one sector (iron & steel). In two sec-
tors (electrical engineering and textiles), this ratio was, how-
ever, increasing. The falls and increases in the other sectors
depended basically on the incidence of cost inflation and cy-
clical factors.
12. The result of the average cost of borrowing showed that the
effective cost of debt is the lowest for the iron & steel indus-
try. It was half as much as that of the automobile and machinery
industries and roughly 1/3 to 1/4 of the same figures of the
electrical machinery, textiles and footwear industries.83














































































































































































































































Sources: BNDES Annual Report, various issues and own calculations.84
Table A2 - BNDES System Gross and Net Disbursements
at Constant Prices of 1985, 1975-1985


































Source: BNDES Annual Report, 1985, p.10.85
Table A3 - Sources of Funding: 32 Major Open or Publicly-Quoced Private-Sector Brazilian































































Note: An open cenpany is one which has opened its share capital to public subscrip-
tion.
Source: IBMEC, in: R. Texeira da Costa, p. 1386













































































































Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1982/83- p. 158, 1984/85, p.
172, 1985/86, p. 274, 1987/88, p. 38; Inter American Devel-
opment Bank, Annual Report 1988, p. 580.87
Table A5 - Estimated Credit Subsidies in Brazil, 1977 and 1978
Origin of Subsidy
Monetary Authorities
Credits to Financial Institutions
Loans & Advances to Financial
Institutes


























































































































Agriculture Lending: 15% of Deposits 32250
Small-Scale Industry: 12% of Deposits 25800
Total: Commercial Banks
Total Balances and Credit Subsidies
Average cost of credits (% p.a.)
Estimate based on liabilities on December 31, 1977 as recorded in December 1978.
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Source: World Bank Country Study: Brazil - Financial Systems Review 1984, p. 39.88



















































































Data from Table 19. The standard corporate income tax rate is 35%,
Source: Own calculations.89
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